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In the bank-borrower setting, a firm's existing lender may exploit its positional advantage to
extract rents from the firm in subsequent financings. Analogously, a startup's existing venture
capital investors (VCs) may dilute the founder through a follow-on financing from these same
VCs (an “inside” round) at an artificially low valuation. Using a hand-collected dataset of
Silicon Valley startup firms, we find little evidence that VCs use inside rounds to dilute
founders. Instead, our findings suggest that inside rounds are generally used as “backstop
financing” for startups that cannot attract new money, and these rounds are conducted at
relatively high valuations (perhaps to reduce litigation risk).















Venture capitalists (VCs) play a critical role in the financing of startup firms (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Hellmann and Puri,
2000). VCs typically invest through several rounds of equity financing. Each round is separately negotiated and priced. After the
initial VC investment, “follow-on” rounds of financing could be provided by either (a) the firm's existing VC investors exclusively
(an inside round) or (b) a group that includes and is usually led by a VC that did not invest in the startup's earlier rounds
(an outside round).
Historically, most follow-on financings were structured as outside rounds (Lerner, 1994). Bringing new investors into a startup
can yield a number of benefits. Among other things, a new investor pricing the deal can mitigate conflict between the
entrepreneur and existing VCs over the value of the firm (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994) and expand the startup's contact network
(Hochberg et al., 2007).
However, in recent years, more than half of all follow-on rounds have been structured as inside rounds (Bengtsson and Sensoy,
2009). In this paper, we posit and seek to test two potential explanations for the use of inside rounds: (1) “dilution” —inside
Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2012) 1104–1120
⁎ Corresponding author at: Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Tel.: +1 617 384 8158.
E-mail address: jfried@law.harvard.edu (J.M. Fried).
0929-1199/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.06.012
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Corporate Finance
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate / jcorpf in
rounds are used to extract rents from the entrepreneur; and (2) “backstop financing” —inside rounds are used to prop up startups
that cannot attract new VCs offering financing on reasonable terms.
Turning first to dilution, inside rounds could be used to extract rents from entrepreneurs through either informational lock-in
or coercive self-dealing. Informational lock-in occurs when information asymmetry between a firm's existing investors and
potential outside investors makes it difficult for the firm to obtain competitive financing from an outside investor (Rajan, 1992;
Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004), thus enabling the existing investors to extract rents in subsequent financings. Although
informational lock-in is typically associated with a bank-borrower relationship, it may also enable VC financers to use inside
rounds to extract rents from an entrepreneur. As in the bank-borrower setting, each VC-backed firm typically receives more than
one round of financing, and a firm's existing VCs may have proprietary information about the firm that could affect the firm's
ability to get follow-on financing from a new investor.
Coercive self-dealing is a more aggressive form of rent extraction than informational lock-in. It involves VCs using their
extensive control rights in the startup (Hellmann, 1998; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) to force the startup to sell them cheap stock
through an inside round (Fluck et al., 2005; Klausner and Litvak, 2001). In fact, while litigation by entrepreneurs against VCs is rare,
many of the lawsuits that are filed allege that VCs used an inside round to dilute the firm's founders (Atanasov et al., 2008).1
An alternative explanation to dilution (either via informational lock-in or coercive self-dealing) is that existing VCs may use
inside rounds as a form of backstop financing: when current VCs are unable to induce outside investors to invest in the firm on
acceptable terms (or at all), current VCs may be forced to resort to inside financing to keep the firm going. Backstop financing is
consistent with evidence that VCs are patient investors (Puri and Zarutskie, forthcoming) and may well explain why the increase
in inside rounds over the last half decade coincided with declines in startup valuations after the dot-com bubble. Unfortunately,
little is known about whether VCs tend to use inside financing rounds to dilute founders or for other purposes, such as
backstopping.
This paper uses detailed data from a sample of VC-backed startups to examine the purpose and effect of inside rounds.
Standard VC databases, such as VentureXpert (VX), do not provide information on round terms or economic returns, and thus
cannot easily be used to test various explanations for inside financing. Instead, we use a hand-collected dataset of 50 Silicon Valley
firms sold in M&A transactions in 2003 or 2004. The dataset was assembled primarily for a study of the conflicts between VCs and
entrepreneurs around M&A exits (see Broughman and Fried, 2010). However, it includes enough fine-grained information about
the firms' financings to compare the terms and financial returns of inside and outside rounds. Moreover, it appears to be the only
available dataset with such detailed information about VC investments.2
We find little evidence of the use of inside rounds for dilutive financing in our sample. Instead, we find that inside rounds are
generally (but not always) used for backstop financing—to support marginal firms that cannot attract outside investors. Our analysis
also indicates that when VCs conduct inside rounds, they tend to use relatively high valuations, perhaps to reduce litigation risk.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we examine the incidence of inside rounds. Consistent with backstop financing, we
find that inside rounds are more likely to occur in firms where VCs lose money. Firms whose exits generated profits for the VCs
rarely used inside financing. We also find that inside rounds increase whenmarket conditions (as proxied by NASDAQ and startup
valuations) deteriorate. Entrepreneurs' own accounts of their firms' fundraising efforts also point to inside rounds generally not
being used for dilution but rather for backstop financing. According to almost every founder in our sample, existing VCs actively
sought outside financing, and resorted to inside rounds only when outside financing was not available.
Even if VCs do not prefer inside rounds, and conduct inside rounds only when outside rounds are not feasible, they may still use
inside rounds to dilute founders by setting valuations too low. Thus, the second step of our analysis is to compare the valuations used
in inside rounds to those used in outside rounds. For each firm, we determine the relative valuation of the last financing round by
dividing the valuation used in the last financing round by the best available proxy of what the firmwas actually worth at the time: its
eventual sale price. If VCs use inside rounds to dilute founders, we would expect the relative valuations of inside rounds to be lower
than the relative valuations of outside rounds. In fact, the relative valuations of inside rounds are higher than outside rounds; in
various regression models the difference is both economically and statistically significant. We perform various robustness checks on
these results and reach the same conclusion: inside rounds are overvalued relative to (and yield lower returns than) outside rounds.
We also find some evidence consistent with valuations being driven by litigation considerations.
We also asked founders about their perceptions of the fairness of each financing round. Consistent with Admati and
Pfleiderer (1994), none of the outside rounds was perceived as unfair. On the other hand, 3 of the 21 founders who experienced
inside rounds indicated that they believed that the terms of the inside rounds were unfair; one of them sued (on a variety of
grounds, including dilution via an inside round). Interestingly, however, in each of these three firms the VCs lost money and
would have been entitled to receive all of the sale proceeds via their liquidation preferences, regardless of the valuations used in
pre-sale financing rounds. Thus, while the founders might have been diluted ex ante at the time of financing, they were not
diluted ex post.
1 In one well-publicized case (Kalashian v. Advent, 1997) a firm's VCs, while in control of the board and holding over 90% of the firm's stock, conducted an
inside financing round at $0.005 per share, reducing the founders' proportional ownership from 8% to 0.007%. Several years later, the VCs took the firm through an
IPO and the share price reached $70. The founders sued, and after a weeklong trial the VCs settled the case for $15 million (King, 1997). After the settlement came
to light, corporate lawyers advised VCs to reduce litigation risk by finding outside investors to price follow-on rounds, and use inside rounds only as a last resort
(King, 1997).
2 Da Rin et al. (2011) discuss available data sources for empirical research into VC financing (see Section 2), emphasizing the lack of reliable round-level data on
financial returns (see Section 5). See also Metrick and Yasuda (2011).
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Given that our sample is limited in number, as well as by time (2003–2004), place (Silicon Valley), and type of exit
(acquisition), we consider the generalizability of our results to other settings. Using VX, we create a second, random sample of
US-based VC-backed firms that had a variety of exit outcomes and operated over a broad time range. Although VX does not
provide data on economic returns, it does provide data on the identity of the VCs investing in each round and on firm outcomes
(IPO, acquisition, defunct, still active). We find that the incidence of inside rounds in the VX sample is consistent with the
financing patterns observed in our sample: inside rounds tend to be preceded by deteriorating market conditions and declining
firm values and followed by worse firm outcomes. Our analysis suggests that even if inside rounds are sometimes used for
dilution, this does not appear to be a widespread practice either in our sample or in the broader population.
Our paper contributes to a better understanding of governance within private VC-backed startups before they are sold. While
academics have studied the contracts VCs usewhen investing in startups (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) and how these arrangements
evolve (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2009) and affect the allocation of sale proceeds (Broughman and Fried, 2010), little is known about
how VCs actually exercise control within these firms prior to exit. Our study provides preliminary evidence suggesting that VCs
generally do not use their positional advantage to dilute founders via inside rounds. Rather, our study suggests that inside rounds are
generally used when outside financing is unavailable, and VCs do not underprice (and may well overprice) inside rounds.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on valuations used in VC-backed firms. Earlier studies have focused on a variety of
factors affecting valuation in this setting, including capital flows into VC funds (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), VC quality (Hsu,
2004), VC bargaining power (Heughebaert and Manigart, 2010), and fund size (Cumming and Dai, 2011). Our study suggests that
assigned valuations may well be systematically higher when follow-on financing is structured as an inside round.
Finally, our project relates to the more general literature on inside financing. While economists have developed a theory of
inside financing in the context of lending relationships (Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004), and found evidence of
informational lock-in in that setting (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010), this effect could also arise in the context of VC financing.
Our study provides preliminary evidence suggesting that informational lock-in does not arise in the VC setting, perhaps because
VCs fear being sued for breach of fiduciary duty. Our findings thus imply that informational lock-in may not be an inherent feature
of inside financing, but rather may depend on specific features of the institutional setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 explains why VCs may have an incentive to use inside financing rounds
to dilute founders. Part 3 describes our dataset. Part 4 presents our findings on the incidence of inside financing. Part 5 compares the
valuations and returns of inside rounds and outside rounds. Part 6 discusses the generalizability of our results. Part 7 concludes.
2. Why inside rounds?
Startup firms typically receive financing from VCs through several rounds (or stages) of investment, each separately
negotiated and priced. The identity of participating investors and the terms of financing may differ from one round to the next
(Gompers, 1995). Each round of financing is typically syndicated among several different VC funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).3
One of these funds—typically the fund with the largest share of the round—is designated the “lead investor” and negotiates the
terms of investment with the startup's board and its shareholders. The terms of investment include cash flow rights and control
rights, such as protective provisions (e.g. the right to veto certain transactions) and board seats.
One of the most important financial terms is the valuation assigned to the startup. VCs typically invest in startups through
some form of preferred stock that is convertible into common shares. For a given amount invested, a lower valuation implies a
larger post-conversion percentage ownership of the firm for the VCs. Thus, everything else equal, VCs investing in the firm will
prefer a lower valuation, and the founder a higher valuation.
In the first round of financing, the lead VC investor negotiates a valuation with the startup's founders, who initially control the
firm. The initial valuation of the startup emerges out of this arm's-length bargaining process. In a follow-on round of financing,
there are VCs on each side of the bargaining table. And in an inside round, the same VCs sit on both sides of the table.
Historically, most follow-on financings were structured as outside rounds (Lerner, 1994), where a new VC negotiates the
terms and typically makes the largest investment, and some or all of the existing VCs invest alongside the new VC. Economists
have identified a number of potential benefits to bringing new investors into the startup. New investors can mitigate conflicts
between the founder and existing VCs over the value of the firm by bargaining over terms at arm's length (Admati and Pfleiderer,
1994; Brander et al., 2002; Lerner, 1994), thereby reducing litigation risk (King, 1997). New investors can also expand the
startup's contact network (Hochberg et al., 2007) and improve fund diversification (Tian, 2012).
From the entrepreneur's perspective, there is minimal risk of dilution in an outside round. Although many (or all) of the existing
VCs typically co-invest in outside rounds (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994), the need to preserve equity-based incentives for employees
and the presence of a large outside investor in the round tend tomake the existing VCs as a group net (indirect) sellers rather than net
buyers. Consequently, in an outside round, the existing VC investors (like the founder in the initial financing) typically have an
incentive to push for a high valuation to minimize the dilutive effect of the round on their pre-existing interests in the firm.
In recent years, however, more than half of follow-on rounds have been structured as inside rounds—rounds where there are
no new investors (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2009). As in an outside round, not all of the existing investors necessarily participate.
Some VCs may invest more than their proportionate share and others may invest less, depending on their assessments of the firm,
their access to capital, and other considerations. The distinguishing feature of an inside round is that all the investors in the round
3 The literature describes several benefits of syndication (Brander et al., 2002; Lerner, 1994; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).
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already own shares in the firm. Below, we discuss two possible explanations for inside rounds: (1) that they are used to dilute the
entrepreneur and (2) that they provide backstop financing for firms that cannot attract outside financing.4
2.1. Inside rounds for dilution
Inside rounds could be used to dilute founders through two different mechanisms: (1) informational lock-in and (2) coercive
self-dealing.
2.1.1. Informational lock-in
In the bank-financing context, theory predicts that a firm's existing bank can extract rents in follow-on loans because information
asymmetry and adverse selection effects make it difficult for the firm to obtain competitive financing from a new lender (Rajan, 1992;
Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004). There is indeed evidence consistentwith such “informational lock-in.” (Ioannidou andOngena, 2010).
Similarly, existing VCs may be able to use proprietary (or ‘soft’) information gained through their relationship with a startup to
extract above-market returns through a subsequent round of inside financing. The existing VCs do not need to actively block the
startup from receiving outside financing; rather, adverse selection makes outside financing unattractive to the entrepreneur even
relative to a dilutive inside round.5
2.1.2. Coercive self-dealing
More aggressively, VCs may be able to use their control rights to forcibly dilute the entrepreneur. VCs typically have substantial
influence over, and often acquire outright control of, their portfolio firms (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). As commentators have
recognized, such power creates the potential for self-dealing in inside rounds (Atanasov et al., 2008; Bartlett and Garlitz, 1995;
Broughman, 2010; Padilla, 2001), a risk that increases with the degree of control exerted by a firm's VCs.
If the VCs control the board and own a sufficient amount of the equity, they can essentially dictate the terms of an inside round
(subject to the possibility of a fiduciary-duty lawsuit).6 Even if VCs lack board control, they may be able to use alternative sources
of control to coerce a firm in need of capital to accept dilutive financing. For example, VCs typically negotiate rights to block any
subsequent financing round they oppose. They can thus block any financing round other than their own, starving the firm of
capital and forcing it to accept an undervalued inside round that gives the VCs a larger share of the firm's equity at the
entrepreneur's expense.
2.2. Inside rounds as backstop financing
An alternative to the dilution explanation is that inside rounds are used to support firms that cannot find an outside investor
willing to invest on what are perceived as reasonable terms (or at all). If an outside investor cannot be found, the existing VCs
generally have two options: either conduct an inside round or liquidate the startup through a dissolution or sale. Dissolution is
likely to substantially reduce—or totally wipe out—the value of the VCs' existing investments in the firm. It will also force the VCs
to mark down the value of their investments, potentially making it more difficult to raise their next funds. A sale is unlikely to
yield a high price if the firm is seen as running out of funds and desperate for a savior. For a firm that cannot attract outside
financing, an inside round can provide useful “backstop financing.”
Even if an inside round is used as backstop financing, the VCs are likely to have at least some influence over the round's
valuation. An inside round could thus involve both backstop financing and dilution. For example, suppose a firm's existing VCs
prefer to bring in an outside investor on fair terms, but cannot find such an investor. They thus resort to an inside round, but then
use their control over the firm to dilute the entrepreneur. To the extent there is such a round, we would not consider the round to
be backstop financing but rather as involving dilution.
2.3. Predictions
The dilution and backstop-financing explanations for inside rounds generate different predictions about the incidence and
valuation of inside rounds. Whether dilution occurs via informational lock-in or coercive self-dealing, inside rounds will have
lower valuations (relative to a firm's actual value) than outside rounds.7 If, on the other hand, VCs generally use inside rounds for
4 There may be other reasons for inside rounds. For example, an inside round may be used when the transaction costs associated with identifying, recruiting,
and integrating a new investor exceed the potential benefits of bringing in a new investor.
5 To reduce adverse selection, outside VCs typically ask that existing VCs participate in the new round (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). But existing VCs could
simply refuse to invest alongside an outside VC, causing the VC to worry about adverse selection and thus to offer worse terms to the startup.
6 If the firm is domiciled in California, common shareholders as a class must approve the financing. Thus, VCs cannot force through a financing unless the VCs have
negotiated drag-along rights that compel common shareholders to support transactions approved by the VCs, the VCs convert some of their preferred stock to common
stock, or the VCs can induce a majority of the common shareholders to support the transaction. See Broughman and Fried (2010); Fried and Ganor (2006).
7 Depending on the allocation of control rights and the amount of information asymmetry in a particular firm, the informational lock-in and coercive self-
dealing mechanisms may yield different predictions about the likelihood of dilutive financing. Nonetheless, both mechanisms predict that inside rounds will tend
to be underpriced and generate higher returns than outside rounds. We can thus reject both versions of the dilution hypothesis if we find that inside rounds
perform no better (or even worse) than outside rounds.
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backstop financing, we would not expect the valuations of inside rounds to be lower than those of outside rounds. Indeed, the
valuations used in inside rounds might be higher. Because an inside round increases litigation risk (King, 1997), VCs forced (or
choosing) to conduct an inside round may decide to offer a higher valuation than would otherwise be used.
3. Data
To explore the purposes and effects of inside rounds, we use data from a sample of Silicon Valley startup firms. The remainder
of this section (i) describes the data source, (ii) describes the firms in the dataset, and (iii) summarizes the terms used in these
firms' follow-on financings.
3.1. Data source
Standard VC databases, such as VentureXpert (VX), do not provide the type of detail necessary to explore whether inside rounds
are used for dilution or other purposes. Such databases do not always disclose critical round terms (including liquidation preferences
and even valuation (Kaplan et al., 2002)).More importantly, they do not report the payoff that round investors receivewhen they exit
the startup.
We thus use a hand-collected dataset of 50 Silicon Valley firms sold in M&A transactions in 2003 or 2004. The dataset was
assembled primarily for a study of the conflicts between VCs and entrepreneurs around M&A exits (see Broughman and Fried,
2010), but includes enough fine-grained information about the firms' financings to compare the terms and performance of inside
and outside rounds in the sample. In particular, for each financing round we observe (i) the composition of the investor group,
(ii) the allocation of board seats and shareholder voting rights, (iii) detailed cash-flow rights (including valuation, participation
rights, conversion rights, liquidation preferences, and cumulative dividends), and (iv) the economic payout upon exit (including
IRR). The data collection process is described in Broughman and Fried (2010).
For the current study on inside rounds, we removed 5 of the 50 firms because they did not receive follow-on financing, or
because the database was missing information on the valuation or other terms of a follow-on round. We thus have an effective
sample of 45 firms, with 90 follow-on rounds of financing.
3.2. Sample description
Our sample firms are “high-tech” businesses, primarily in the biotech, software, telecommunications, and internet sectors
(Panel A of Table 1). The concentration of firms in the sample is representative of VC-financed firms generally (Kaplan and
Strömberg, 2003 at 284). Consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Daines (2002), all of the sample firms were
incorporated in either their home state (which, for all of these firms, was California) or Delaware. Panel B shows that 31 sample
firms were incorporated in Delaware and 14 in California.
At the time of sale, the sample firms had received an average of $44 million in VC funding,8 and had been operating for an average of
approximately five years. The average sale pricewas $55 million, but therewas considerable variance in exit outcomes. Some firmswere
essentially liquidated, yielding a sale price of less than $1million, while other firms were sold for considerably more than $100 million.
We report data on how the sale proceeds were divided among the different classes of shareholders. Since we know the date of each
round and the date of sale, we can calculate the VCs' internal rate of return (IRR) for each round and for each firm. The VCs' average IRR
was 0.20. However, only 16 of the 45 firms were sold for a profit, indicating that the average IRR is skewed by a few highly profitable
firms. Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the amount invested, years of operation, entrepreneur experience, and sale price.
3.3. Financing round characteristics
The 45 firms in this study received, on average, three rounds of VC financing (Panel B, Table 1). Of the 90 follow-on rounds, 26
(29%) were inside, and 64 (71%) were outside. We collect detailed information on each round, including the composition of the
investor group, the allocation of board control, the VCs' cash-flow rights, and the valuation used in the financing.9 Table 2 defines
variables used throughout the remainder of the paper and provides a correlation matrix.
We record the nominal post-money valuation for each round of financing.10 The nominal valuation is equal to the VCs' investment
divided by the fraction of common stock that theVCs are entitled to receive on a fully converted basis. If thenominal pre-money valuation
(post-money valuation less the amount invested) is higher than the post-money valuation of the previous round, the new round is
considered an “up round.” If the nominal pre-money valuation is lower than the post-money valuation of the previous round, the new
8 The companies in our sample also received, on average, $0.15 million in entrepreneur/family financing and $0.45 million in angel financing before VCs invested.
9 While we were able to determine which VC led each round, and the identities of all the VCs participating in the round, we were unable to get the precise
amount invested by each VC in each round.
10 While nominal valuation is the standard method of valuing VC-backed startups, it implicitly assumes that the common stock held by entrepreneurs has the
same value as the VCs' preferred stock. In fact, preferred stock typically includes a liquidation preference and other rights that make it more valuable than
common stock (Metrick, 2007). To account for the value of these rights we also record valuation on an implied basis using an option valuation technique outlined
in Metrick (2007). For the purpose of calculating implied valuations, we use an annualized volatility for the VC industry of 89% (Cochrane, 2005). For details on
this approach, see Metrick (2007, pp. 252–87). The method of valuation—nominal or implied—does not affect our findings reported below. We ran all regressions
in Table 4 (below) using both methods of valuation, and found qualitatively similar results.
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round is considered a “down round.” If the pre-money valuation of the new round is the same as the previous round's post-money
valuation, the round is called “even” (or “flat”). Of the 90 rounds, 45 (50%) were up, 14 (16%) were even, and 31 (34%) were down.
4. Incidence of inside rounds
We begin by examining the incidence of inside rounds: the relationship between inside rounds and down rounds, the
relationship between inside rounds and firm profitability (whether the firms generate profits or losses for the VCs), and
entrepreneurs' own accounts of why their firms had inside rounds. All of this evidence is generally consistent with inside rounds
Table 1
Description of the dataset.
Panel A: Industry distribution of companies
Sector
Biotech Telecom Software Internet Other IT
Sample firms (n=45) 6 11 11 9 8
Panel B: Firm overview
Obs Count Mean Med. SD
Years of operation 45 5.13 5 1.65
Year founded 45 1998.38 1998 1.77
Number of financing rounds 45 3.00 3 1.01
Total invested (millions $) 45 43.99 31 37.65
Sale price (millions $) 45 55.22 22 108.95
Firm IRR 45 0.20 −0.13 2.03
Profitable 45 16 0.36 0 0.48
Number of founders 45 2.31 2 1.24
Serial entrepreneur 45 20 0.44 0 0.50
Prior experience with VC 45 23 0.51 1 0.51
California incorporation 45 14 0.31 0 0.47
Delaware incorporation 45 31 0.69 1 0.47
This table provides descriptive statistics for a sample of 45 Silicon Valley VC‐backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004. Panel A shows the industry distribution, based on
sector classifications provided by www.linksv.com. Panel B reports summary statistics for the sample firms.
Table 2
Variable definitions and correlation matrix.
Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Round IRR −.04 –
2 Inside .29 −.01 –
3 VC control .23 v.01 .23 –
4 California .34 .07 −.10 −.18 –
5 VC ownership % .59 −.03 .27 .28 −.03 –
6 ΔNASDAQ sale (%) −.09 .36 .25 .09 −.26 −.04 –
7 ΔNASDAQ (%) −.35 −.35 −.20 −.02 .12 .09 −.52 –
8 VC reputation .44 .09 .22 −.07 .10 .12 .11 −.04 –
9 Duration fin to sale 2.63 −.44 −.26 −.27 .06 −.19 −.37 .54 −.05 –
10 Investment 16.46 −.11 −.20 −.06 .09 .22 −.28 .21 −08 .03 –
11 Number of directors 5.16 .17 .12 .20 .26 .56 .09 −.10 .09 −.28 .08 –
12 Up .50 −.09 −.54 −.13 .07 −.17 −.44 .37 −.09 .35 .27 −.15 –
13 Down .34 .03 .31 .15 −.13 .25 .30 −.29 .06 −.40 −.16 .13 −.72 –
14 Even .16 .07 .34 −.02 .08 −.09 .21 −.13 .05 .04 −.16 .04 −.43 −.31 –
This table defines the round-level variables for a sample of 45 Silicon Valley VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004. The above correlation matrix shows the mean
and pairwise correlations among the variables for the sample. Data are presented only for 90 follow-on rounds of financing. Round IRR equals the internal rate of
return for each round of VC financing; Inside equals 1 if a new round of financing is provided entirely by a firm's existing investors and 0 otherwise; VC control
equals 1 if the VCs control the board immediately preceding a round of financing and 0 otherwise; California equals 1 if the firm is incorporated in California and
0 otherwise; VC ownership % equals the fraction of a firm's cash flow rights on a fully converted basis collectively held by its existing VCs immediately prior to a
follow-on round of financing; ΔNASDAQ sale (%) equals the percentage change in the closing price of the NASDAQ national market from the date of financing to
the date of sale; ΔNASDAQ (%) equals the percentage change in the closing price of the NASDAQ national market from the date of the previous round of financing
to the new follow-on round; VC reputation equals one if the VC firm leading the round of financing was formed prior to the median year of formation for the VCs
in our sample (1990), and zero otherwise; Duration financing to sale equals the number of years between the current round of financing and the sale of the firm;
Investment equals the amount invested (in millions of dollars) in a round of financing; Number of directors equals the number of directors on the board
immediately prior to a new round of financing; Up equals 1 if a round of financing has a higher pre-money valuation than the post-money valuation of the
previous round and 0 otherwise; Down equals 1 if a round of financing has a lower pre-money valuation than the post-money valuation of the previous round and
0 otherwise; Even equals 1 if a round of financing has the same pre-money valuation as the post-money valuation of the previous round and 0 otherwise.
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being used as backstop financing to support marginal firms that cannot otherwise obtain financing, and generally inconsistent
with the dilution explanation for inside rounds.
4.1. Inside rounds and down rounds
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between the identity of the lead investor and round valuation changes. Inside-led rounds are
generally down (or even) rounds, while outside rounds are typically up rounds.
The correlation between inside and down rounds is potentially consistent with both dilution and backstop financing. If inside
rounds are used to support marginal firms, we would expect firms whose values have declined to be more likely to receive inside
rounds (backstop financing). But the observed correlation is also consistent with existing VCs opportunistically exploiting
informational lock-in or their control rights to underprice inside rounds (dilution). Under the backstop-financing explanation,
lower valuations lead to inside rounds. Under the dilution explanation, inside rounds lead to lower valuations.
In our sample, declines in valuation appear to drive the use of inside rounds, and not vice versa. Fig. 2 shows graphically that
inside rounds are highly correlated with changes in NASDAQ, a proxy for startup market conditions. Both down and inside rounds
decline in tandem as NASDAQ increases from 1997 to 2000, and then inside and down rounds increase in tandem as NASDAQ
drops from 2000 to 2004.11
4.2. Inside rounds and Firm IRR
Further evidence that inside rounds are used for backstop financing (and not dilution) can be found in the relationship
between the use of inside financing and the IRR generated by each firm for its VCs (“Firm IRR”). Fig. 3 shows a strong negative
relationship between the fraction of financing coming from inside rounds and Firm IRR. This suggests that inside rounds are more
likely to occur in firms that perform poorly.
In each sample firm, VCs invest through preferred stock with a liquidation preference of at least 1x the amount invested. Thus,
if the firm is sold for a loss (Firm IRRb0), the entrepreneur is not entitled to any of the exit proceeds, and cannot have been
diluted ex post by any financing round. For inside financing to shift value from a firm's entrepreneurs to its VCs ex post, the firm
must be sold for a profit (Firm IRR>0).
Table 3 provides additional information on the relationship between inside financing and Firm IRR. Twenty-one firms received
at least one round of inside financing. Only four of these firms (19%) were sold for a profit. Of the 24 firms that did not receive
inside financing, 12 were sold for a profit (50%). In addition, mean Firm IRR is lower for firms that received inside rounds (−0.33)
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Follow-on Rounds (n= ) Up Even Down
All follow-on rounds 90 50% 16% 34%
Outside rounds 64 67% 8% 25%
Inside rounds 26 8% 35% 58%
t-test for Equal Means -6.01*** 3.34*** 3.08***
* = 10% significance; ** = 5% significance; *** = 1% significance
Fig. 1. The relationship between inside rounds and valuation changes.
This figure illustrates the relationship between the use of inside rounds and valuation changes since the last round of financing. The data are from a sample of 90
follow-on rounds of financing from 45 VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004. The horizontal axis indicates the amount of valuation change since the last round.
“Even” means no change in the valuation. “−25” means that the valuation change was negative but not less than −25%; “25” means that the valuation change
was positive but not greater than 25%. The table below Fig. 1 reports the percent of outside and inside rounds that are Up, Even, and Down. The table includes a
difference of means t-test comparing the distribution of inside and outside rounds.
11 In unreported regressions, we find that, controlling for various firm characteristics, a decline in NASDAQ between financing rounds increases the likelihood
that the subsequent round is (1) a down or flat round; (2) an inside round; or (3) a down (or flat) inside round. Thus, consistent with backstop financing,
deteriorating market conditions increase the use of inside rounds in our sample.
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Table 3 also shows that most profit firms (Firm IRR>0) did not receive any inside financing at all. In fact, only 25% of profit firms
received any inside financing. On average, profit firms received only 5% of their total financing from inside rounds. In contrast, 59%
of loss firms (Firm IRRb0) received inside financing, and on average loss firms received 20% of their total financing from inside
rounds. These differences are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
4.3. Founders' own assessments
We asked the founders to describe the circumstances of each round of financing. Almost all of the founders indicated that the
existing VCs had encouraged them to find outside VCs to invest in the firm. With two exceptions described below, inside rounds













































Lowess Fit Fraction of Inside Rounds
Lowess Fit Fraction of Down Rounds
Year of Financing
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Observations 6 12 18 24 19 11
Inside 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.29 0.47 0.45
Down 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.42 0.63 0.55
Fig. 2. Inside financing by year.
This figure illustrates the use of inside rounds and down rounds based on the time of financing. The data are from a sample of 45 VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or
2004, covering 90 follow-on rounds of investment. The top portion of the diagram graphs the NASDAQweekly closing price from the beginning of 1997 to the end
of 2003. The bottom portion of the diagram uses a Lowess curve to plot the likelihood of inside financing and down-round financing over the same time period.
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Fig. 3. Firm IRR sorted by firm's fraction of inside financing.
This figure displays Firm IRR for each firm in a sample of 45 VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004, with sorting based on the fraction of financing dollars received
through inside rounds. To preserve confidentiality (and for ease of presentation) Firm IRR is capped at 1. The fitted line shows a negative correlation between
inside financing and Firm IRR.
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We will call the two exceptions “Firm X” and “Firm Y” (the names are omitted to preserve confidentiality). In Firm X, both the
original investor (a private equity shop that typically invests in larger businesses) and the founders decided to accept inside
financing without first seeking an outside investor. When Firm X was eventually sold, it generated considerable profits for both
the investor and the founders.
In Firm Y, the VCs pushed through a bridge financing round with large repayment obligations shortly before the firm was sold;
other investors (including the firm's common shareholders) were excluded from participating in this bridge financing. Because of
the circumstances surrounding this financing round and other alleged misbehavior by the VCs, the founder sued the VCs. The case
was eventually settled for an undisclosed amount. While a total of three firms in our sample experienced litigation between VCs
and entrepreneurs, Firm Y was the only firm in our sample that saw litigation over an allegedly dilutive round of financing.
5. Analysis of inside vs. outside round valuations
The data presented in Part 4 suggests that most (but not all) inside rounds are undertaken to provide financing to firms that
have difficulty attracting outside investors, generally the most poorly performing firms. However, even if inside rounds were not
caused by a desire to dilute founders but rather by the failure to find outside investors, inside rounds could still dilute founders if
the assigned valuations are too low. We now consider the valuations used in inside rounds, focusing primarily on the valuations
used in the last financing round of each firm.
5.1. Last-round valuations: inside vs. outside
To determine whether inside rounds are dilutive, we would ideally measure the difference between the valuation used in each
follow-on financing round and the firm's “true” value at the time of the financing, and thereby be able to determine whether
inside rounds are systematically underpriced. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to observe the “true” value of a private
company before it is sold. Thus, we use the eventual sale price of the firm—negotiated at arm's length between the buyer and the
firm's investors—as a proxy for the firm's “true” value in the last round of financing. This strategy permits us to compare inside
and outside valuations in the last round of financing of each firm.
To be sure, the sale price reflects in part events that occur after the last round of financing. Consequently, sale price is not a
perfect indicator of the firm's actual value at the last round of financing. Nonetheless, as long as such distortions are randomly
distributed or otherwise controlled for in the regressions below, the sale price can serve as an unbiased estimate of a firm's value
at the time of the last financing.12
Thus, for each firm,we compare the valuation of the firm used in the last round of VC financing (last round valuation) to the sale
price. Our dependent variable is the ratio (last round valuation)/(sale price) or “LRV/SP.” If inside rounds are used to dilute founders,
LRV/SP will be systematically lower in inside rounds than in outside rounds. If VCs are constrained by reputational considerations
or fear of litigation (Black and Gilson, 1998), LRV/SP will be the same in inside rounds as in outside rounds, or even higher.
Fig. 4 illustrates the distribution of LRV/SP for inside rounds and outside rounds. Inside rounds often have an LRV/SP ratio
exceeding 2. In contrast, in outside rounds LRV/SP is generally close to 1. Inside rounds appear overvalued relative to the ultimate
sale price, while outside rounds do not.
Table 3
Univariate difference of means test.
Panel A
Inside (n=21) Outside (n=24)
Profitable firms (fraction) 0.19 0.50 −2.23**
Mean Firm IRR −0.33 0.65 −1.75*
Mean Firm IRR ($ weighted) −0.26 0.10 −1.67
Pamel B
Profit (n=16) Loss (n=29)
Fraction of firms with one or more inside rounds 0.25 0.59 −2.32**
Fraction of dollars from inside rounds 0.05 0.20 −2.70***
Mean inside rounds per firm 0.25 0.76 −2.87***
*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
This table reports various differences of means from a sample of 45 VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004. In Panel A, data are separately reported for (a) firms
that had at least one inside financing round and (b) firms that had only outside follow-on rounds. In Panel B, data are separately reported for (a) profit firms
(IRR>0) and (b) loss firms (IRR b 0). The final column reports t-stats for difference-of-means tests.
12 The presence of a new outside investor may add value to a firm by bringing new capabilities and connections (Brander et al., 2002). This, in turn, might appear
to create an endogeneity problem: if firms that attract outside investors unexpectedly turn out to be more valuable for this reason, their relative last-round
valuations (last-round valuation divided by sale price) will be biased downward. But this endogeneity problem would arise only if the parties could not, at the
time of the last round of financing, form an unbiased estimate of the outside investor's effect on the firm's value and incorporate this estimate into the round
valuation.
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To test for dilution in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following equation:
Log LRV=SPð Þ ¼ F Inside;Controlsð Þ ð1Þ
The dependent variable in Eq. (1) is the natural log of LRV/SP. We take the natural log so that data are not left-truncated at
zero.
Our primary treatment variable records whether the last round of financing was an inside round. Because the risk of dilutive
financing is greater when VCs control the board, we include VC control as a right-hand side variable. If dilutive financing is
common, Inside will have a negative effect on Log(LRV/SP), especially if the VCs also control the board.
We include other factors that might affect the sale price and the last round valuation. California equals one if the firm was
incorporated in California, and zero otherwise. Relative to Delaware incorporation, California domicile is likely to provide greater
protection to minority shareholders (Broughman and Fried, 2010). Consequently, California domicile may limit a VC's ability or
willingness to push for a low valuation.
ΔNASDAQ Sale (%) equals the percentage change in NASDAQ from the date of financing to the date of sale. This term controls
for factors that might affect the sale price but could not have been foreseen by the parties on the date of financing. VC reputation
equals one if the VC firm leading the round of financing was formed prior to the median year of formation for the VCs in our
sample (1990), and zero otherwise. This term controls for possible valuation discounts given to VCs with good reputations (Hsu,
2004). Duration fin. to sale equals the number of years between the last round of financing and the sale of the firm. Finally,
Investment measures the amount invested in the last round of financing (in millions).
Regression results are shown in Table 4. Model (4‐1) reports univariate results, and in models (4‐2) and (4‐3) we add the
above control variables and industry dummies. In each specification, we find a significant positive correlation between Inside and
Log(LRV/SP). Relative to the sale price, significantly higher valuations are used in inside last rounds than in outside last rounds.
These results are inconsistent with the use of inside rounds for dilutive financing.
5.2. Robustness checks
We conduct several robustness checks on the results reported in Table 4. First, we address the possibility that outliers may
drive our results. Given a small sample size, outlier observations could have a large effect on the coefficient estimates reported in
Table 4. We thus re-estimate model (4‐2) using weighted least squares ('WLS') and robust regression (‘RREG’). TheWLS estimates
reported in model (4‐4) are weighted based on the amount invested in the round, ensuring that our results are not driven by
small investments of little economic significance. RREG assigns weights to each observation in order to reduce the effect of
outliers and then re-estimates on the weighted observations. RREG estimates are reported in model (4‐5). We find the same basic
result using WLS and RREG: inside financing is associated with a positive and significant effect on the relative valuation of the
firm. Our results thus do not appear to be driven by outliers.
Second, we separately focus on the subset of profit firms. Inside financing might serve different purposes in profit firms than in
loss firms. In loss firms, inside financing may serve a backstop-financing function. In profit firms, inside financing could be used for
dilution. If so, inside rounds may be undervalued in profit firms but not in loss firms. To address this possibility, we re-estimate
model (4‐2) limited to the subsample of profit firms. Results are reported in model (4‐6). Even among the 16 profit firms, inside
rounds are associated with higher relative valuations. In both the full sample and the profit-firm subsample, inside rounds seem to























Fig. 4. Last round valuation over sale price.
This figure illustrates the ratio (Last Round Valuation)/(Sale Price) (LRV/SP) from a sample of 45 VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004. Data are sorted based on
whether the last round was an inside round or an outside round. The diagram above illustrates the distribution of LRV/SP for inside rounds and outside rounds
using a standard box plot (with outlier values excluded).
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Our results could be biased by omitted variables that correlate with both the use of inside financing and valuation. Ideally, we
would instrument for the use of inside financing. However, a suitable instrument does not appear available.13 Thus, although we
attempt to address this concern by examining valuation relative to the firm's ultimate sale price (LRV/SP), and by controlling for
other factors that may affect round pricing, we cannot claim to have firmly established causation.
5.3. Returns from all follow-on rounds: inside vs. outside
We also examine the returns of all 90 follow-on rounds (not just the 45 final rounds). If inside rounds were consistently
underpriced, they should yield higher returns than outside rounds. Fig. 5 shows the VCs' internal rate of return for each round of
financing (Round IRR) for all 90 follow-on rounds based on the time of financing. On average, inside rounds have a lower IRR over
almost the entire time period. To be sure, the results reported in Fig. 5 do not control for other factors affecting round
performance. But they do provide additional evidence suggesting that inside rounds are not underpriced and, if anything, are
likely to be overpriced.
5.4. Founders' own assessments
Finally, we asked founders if any follow-on financings in their firms were dilutive (at an "unfair" price). Consistent with
Admati and Pfleiderer's (1994) claim that outside rounds are used to mitigate conflicts between the existing VCs and the founder
over valuation, none of the founders claimed that any outside rounds were dilutive. However, three respondents (including the
founder of Firm Y) claimed that an inside round was dilutive. Interestingly, in each of these three firms, the VCs suffered losses
(Firm IRRb0). Even if the firms received artificially low valuations, these low valuations did not expropriate value from
entrepreneurs ex post, since the VCs would have been entitled to the full exit payout (via liquidation preferences) regardless of
13 In an earlier draft, we had considered VC fund age as a possible instrument for the availability of inside financing. Limited partnership agreements typically
place restrictions on additional investments as a fund ages, making it difficult for an older fund (or a syndicate of older funds) to finance a startup through an
inside round. Unfortunately, fund age is a weak instrument with a very low first-stage F-statistic (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Also, VCs' practice of cross-fund
investing complicates the use of fund age as an instrumental variable.
Table 4
Regression analysis of valuation: inside versus outside financing.
OLS WLS RREG OLS
(4‐1) (4‐2) (4‐3) (4‐4) (4‐5) (4‐6)
Treatment variable
Inside .912** .942** .800* 1.127* 1.078*** .373*
(.447) (.461) (.469) (.577) (.352) (.191)
Control variables
VC control 1.563*** 1.760*** 1.441** 1.005** .723
(.580) (.591) (.674) (.392) (.494)
California .980** .983*** 1.089** .669* 1.221**
(.419) (.349) (.408) (.393) (.399)
ΔNASDAQ sale (%) −.213 −.352 −.795 .443 1.711
(.693) (.626) (.731) (.545) (1.051)
VC reputation −.394 −.052 −1.050* −.433 .148
(.455) (.404) (.595) (.356) (.355)
Duration fin to sale .540** .541** .451* .501* .204
(.216) (.207) (.253) (.260) (.384)
Investment .009 .017 .013 .008 −.037***
(.024) (.018) (.020) (.017) (.011)
Industry dummies Yes
Constant .237 −1.337 −1.182 −.960 −1.323 −1.309
(.286) (.524) (.549) (.719) (.571) (.813)
R2 .09 .43 .56 .51 – .75
F-stat – – – – 3.26 –
No. of observations 45 45 45 45 45 16
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS), weighted least squares (WLS), and robust regression (RREG) estimates on a sample of 45 VC-backed firms sold in
2003 or 2004. The dependent variable is Log Last Round over Sale Price, which measures the log of the ratio of the last round valuation (nominal) to the sale price.
The unit of analysis is the last round of financing, and consequently there is only one observation for each firm. The treatment variable records whether the last
round of financing was an inside round (Inside). All remaining explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. The WLS estimates reported in model (4-4) are
weighted based on the amount invested in the round. Robust (White, 1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. We use a
two-sided test for statistical significance [*=10% significance; **=5% significance; ***=1% significance].
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the valuation assigned in an earlier financing round. In other words, the founders may have been diluted ex ante, but they were
not diluted ex post.
Founders' own accounts suggest that inside rounds, whatever their cause, are generally not unfairly priced. While founders'
perceptions could be distorted, they are consistent with the results of our econometric analysis. Taken together, the founders'
accounts and our statistical analysis suggest that most inside rounds do not dilute founders, at least in our sample of Silicon Valley
portfolio firms.
5.5. Why might inside rounds be overvalued?
In our sample, there is some evidence that inside rounds are overvalued relative to outside rounds. We describe several
possible explanations for why inside rounds might be relatively overvalued. Although we do not seek to test these explanations
formally, we do note where the explanations appear consistent with our data and econometric results.
5.5.1. Litigation risk
Being sued by a founder imposes many costs on VCs, including a potential hit to reputation (Atanasov et al., 2008).The risk of
liability (and, therefore, of a lawsuit) is higher if the VCs participating in a follow-on round of financing control the board; if an
outside investor does not price the follow-on round (King, 1997); and if the firm is domiciled in California (rather than Delaware),
as California law is generally more protective of minority shareholders (Broughman and Fried, 2010).
To the extent that litigation concerns affect valuations, we would thus expect valuations to be higher when (i) VCs control the
board, (ii) the firm is domiciled in California (rather than Delaware), or (iii) the financing is an inside round. Consistent with this
prediction, VC Control, California, and Inside have positive coefficients in all models reported in Table 4. These results suggest that
VCs are constrained by litigation concerns when pricing follow-on rounds of financing.
5.5.2. Non-litigation reasons for overvaluing inside rounds
First, existing VCs conducting an inside round may deliberately overvalue the firm to engage in “false signaling.” In particular,
overvaluing an inside round can be used to “window-dress” VCs' returns to facilitate fund-raising (Cumming and Walz, 2010;
Lerner, 1994), to reduce the likelihood of receiving a low-ball offer at the next round of outside financing, and to mitigate the
adverse effects of a low-valuation financing on employee morale at the firm.
Second, VCs may overvalue inside rounds to reduce “down-round” costs. If the firm's value has declined since the previous
round, a round at the “correct” valuation will trigger the anti-dilution provisions in the existing VCs' investment contracts. These
provisions must often be renegotiated to preserve incentives for the firm's employees (Bartlett, 2003). To avoid these costs,
existing VCs may prefer to conduct an even (flat) round rather than a down round in order to avoid triggering anti-dilution
provisions. Indeed, as Fig. 1 indicates, a very high proportion of inside rounds are flat rounds, and a very high proportion of flat
rounds are inside rounds.
Third, existing VCs may simply overvalue the firm because of over-optimism or “hubris” (Roll, 1986). If an outside offer is
received, hubris or over-optimism might cause the existing VCs to turn down the offer because they mistakenly view it as “too
low,” causing them to finance the firm at a valuation that the VCs view as reasonable but is in fact too high. Similarly, if an outside
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Fig. 5. Round IRR over time of financing.
This figure shows the IRR for each follow-on round of financing in a sample of 45 VC-backed firms sold in 2003 or 2004, covering 90 discrete follow-on rounds.
Outside rounds are indicated with dots while inside rounds are indicated with plus signs. The graph also shows a Lowess curve plotting the IRR over time for
outside rounds (solid line) and for inside rounds (dashed line).
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6. Are the results generalizable?
The sample is limited to 45 Silicon Valley firms sold in 2003 or 2004 for which entrepreneurs agreed to provide us information,
raising questions about the generalizability of our results.
To begin, the entrepreneurs who agreed to provide us with data may not be representative of the sample population. It is
possible that non-responding entrepreneurs were more likely to have experienced dilution from inside rounds. We thus compare
the frequency of litigation involving the VC investors in the sample firms to other Silicon Valley firms sold in M&A transactions in
2003 and 2004. We find a higher incidence of litigation in our sample.14 Thus, conflict between the entrepreneurs and VC
investors does not appear to be underrepresented in our sample.15
Three other representativeness issues are worth noting. First, our sample does not include exits that take the form of a straight
dissolution or IPO. VCs might use inside rounds to dilute entrepreneurs only in their best-performing firms—those that are most
likely to exit via IPO. By omitting IPO exits, our results may understate the extent to which VCs use inside rounds for dilution.
Second, California VCs and startups appear to use financing contracts that are more favorable to entrepreneurs (Bengtsson and
Ravid, 2010), raising the possibility that non-California VCs investing outside of California may be more likely to use inside rounds
for dilution than the VCs in our sample. Third, the firms in our sample received much of their financing at the height of the
dot-com bubble and were sold a couple of years after it burst. The performance of inside rounds during this period may not reflect
the performance of inside rounds in other periods.
To address these concerns, we use VentureXpert (VX) to construct a random sample of VC-backed firms located across
the US, covering all exit outcomes, and operating over a broad period of time (the “VX sample”). We classify follow-on
financing rounds in the VX sample as inside or outside, and then compare the incidence of inside rounds in the main and VX
samples.
Although VX's data are relatively limited, the financing patterns that emerge in the VX sample are broadly consistent with
data from our main sample. First, the frequency of inside rounds in our main sample is similar to the frequency of inside
rounds in both California-based firms and acquired firms in the VX sample. Second, as in the main sample, inside rounds in the
VX sample tend to be preceded by declines in NASDAQ and are strongly associated with even- and down-rounds, not
up-rounds. Third, inside rounds in the VX sample are also, on average, followed by worse firm outcomes. For example, inside
rounds made up approximately 20% of the follow-on financings of firms that exited via IPO but over 40% of the follow-on
financings of firms that failed or remained unsold many years after their initial financings. Given that far fewer startups exit
through IPOs than fail or remain unsold, the primary selection bias regarding inside rounds in the main sample appears to be
the underrepresentation of inside rounds in poorly-performing firms, not the underrepresentation of inside rounds in
successful firms. A description and analysis of the VX sample can be found in Appendix A. This analysis suggests that even if
inside rounds were more frequently used for dilution outside our sample than inside our sample, they are generally not used
for that purpose.
7. Conclusion
Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley VC-backed firms, we investigate whether VCs investing in these firms used
inside rounds—financing rounds in which only existing VCs participate—to dilute founders via an informational lock-in effect or
coercive self-dealing. We find little evidence in our sample that inside rounds are used to engage in dilutive financing. Instead, we
find that inside rounds are generally used for what we call “backstop financing” — supporting marginal firms that cannot attract
outside investors. Our analysis also indicates that when VCs conduct inside rounds they tend to use relatively high valuations,
perhaps to reduce litigation risk.
Our paper offers a new window into the governance of private VC-backed startups before they are sold by providing evidence
that VCs generally do not use their positional advantage and control rights to dilute entrepreneurs. It also suggests that the
valuations used in VC rounds are affected not only by such factors as VC quality and VC bargaining power but also by whether the
round is inside or outside. Finally, it provides preliminary evidence that the informational lock-in effect observed in inside bank
financing may not arise in the VC setting, perhaps because fear of fiduciary-duty litigation prevents VCs from underpricing inside
rounds. We hope that our work is useful to courts, legislatures, practitioners, and academics seeking to understand and improve
the corporate governance of VC-backed firms.
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Appendix A
To supplement the results of our study of the main sample in this paper, we generate and analyze a random sample of
VC-backed startups from VentureXpert (VX), the most commonly-used commercial database for empirical work related to
venture capital (Da Rin et al., 2011). VX does not provide data on round returns and is often missing information on round
valuation. VX does, however, let us compare the incidence of inside rounds in VX to our main sample. The results from our VX
study are broadly consistent with the use of inside rounds for backstop financing rather than dilution.
A.1. VX sample description
The VX sample is composed of VC-backed firms randomly selected from all US firms in VentureXpert (VX) that were
founded between 1/1/1996 and 12/31/2002, received at least $5 million of VC financing, and disclosed valuation data for at
least one round of financing. 4070 firms in VX met the above criteria; we select every 40th firm, giving us a random
sub-sample of 102 firms.
Most of the VX sample firms (94 out of 102) received follow-on financing. We exclude follow-on rounds that occur within
3 months of the previous financing; even though they are reported as “rounds” in VX, they are unlikely to be separately
negotiated (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2009; Cumming and Dai, 2011). We also exclude rounds that do not include a VC investor. We
are left with a total of 312 follow-on rounds in the VX sample. We code the round status—inside or outside—for each of the 312
follow-on rounds. There were 186 (60%) outside rounds and 126 (40%) inside rounds. Firms in the VX sample received an average
of 3 follow-on rounds of financing.
Table A1 provides firm-level statistics for the businesses in the VX sample. The firms are primarily in the internet, medical/
health, and software sectors (Panel A of Table A1). The concentration in high-tech businesses is similar to the main sample. As of
June 2010, VX sample firms received on average $50 million in VC funding, compared to $44 million in the main sample.16 More
Table A1
VX sample firm data (n=102).








VX sample Main sample
Variable Obs. Count Mean Obs. Count Mean
Total Invested ($M) 102 50.477 45 43.999
Number of rounds 102 4.069 45 3.00
Year of first financing 102 1999.402 45 1998.38
California location 102 47 .461 45 45 1
IPO 102 14 .137 n/a n/a
Acquisition 102 40 .392 45 45 1
Active 102 28 .275 n/a n/a
Defunct 102 20 .196 n/a n/a
16 VX sample firms that are still active may receive additional financing in the future.
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than half of the VX sample firms (54%) were located in California, giving us information on the use of inside rounds both in and
outside that state.
Table A1 (Panel B) also reports data on the current (as of mid-2010) exit status—IPO, acquisition, active, or defunct—for the VX
sample firms. Just over half the VX sample firms had achieved an exit event by mid-2010, either an IPO (14%) or private sale
(39%). The remaining firms were either defunct (20%) or remained active (27%). Table A2 (above) shows the frequency of inside
and outside financing in the VX sample and the main sample sorted across a number of dimensions.
A.2. Comparison of VX sample to main sample
The remainder of this appendix compares the use of inside financing in the VX and main samples.
Frequency of inside rounds
Overall, inside rounds are somewhat more common in the VX sample (40%) than in the main sample (29%). In the VX sample,
inside rounds occur more frequently outside California (47%) and in firms that have failed to achieve a successful exit (i.e., firms
that are defunct or active). Inside rounds are less common in IPO firms (21%) than in the VX sample as a whole and in the main
sample. But the frequency of inside rounds in firms located in California (33%) or in acquired firms (34%) is similar to that in the
main sample. This suggests that the main sample is fairly representative of California-based firms and firms that are ultimately
acquired, but may understate the overall frequency of inside financing.
However, the VX sample suggests that inside rounds are disproportionately concentrated in the most poorly-performing firms.
More than half of the 126 inside rounds in the VX sample occurred in poorly-performing firms, namely those that are defunct (19) or
active (57). Since all firms in the VX sample received initial financing in 2002 or earlier, the active firms are likely to be “walking dead”
or “zombie” firms that are unlikely to yield large returns for the VCs. Thus, the primary selection bias regarding inside rounds in the
main sample appears to be the underrepresentation of inside rounds in poorly-performing firms, not the underrepresentation of
inside rounds in successful firms.
Inside rounds and NASDAQ
As in the main sample, firms in the VX sample are significantly more likely to rely on inside financing when NASDAQ—a rough
proxy for startups' value—has declined since the prior round. Fig. A1 displays, for each year in the period 1997–2004, the
frequencies of inside and down round financing in both the VX sample and the main sample as well as the NASDAQ index. The top
portion graphs weekly NASDAQ closing prices from 1997 to 2004. The middle and bottom portions illustrate the frequencies of
inside and down rounds in the main sample (middle portion) and VX sample (bottom portion) over the same time period. In both
Table A2
VX sample follow-on round data (n=312).
VX sample Main sample
Inside Outside Inside Outside
(n=) # (%) # (%) (n=) # (%) # (%)
Full sample 312 126 40% 186 60% 90 26 29% 64 71%
Sorted by state
CA 143 47 33% 96 67% 90 26 29% 64 71%
Non-CA 169 79 47% 90 53% n/a
Sorted by exit status
IPO 48 10 21% 38 79% n/a
Acquisition 118 40 34% 78 66% 90 26 29% 64 71%
Active 103 57 55% 46 45% n/a
Defunct 43 19 44% 24 56% n/a
Sorted by valuation
Up 73 9 12% 64 88% 45 2 4% 43 96%
Down 26 8 31% 18 69% 31 15 48% 16 52%
Even 13 7 54% 6 46% 14 9 64% 5 36%
Missing 200 102 51% 98 49% n/a
Sorted by year
1998 (or earlier) 20 5 25% 15 75% 6 2 33% 4 67%
1999 35 3 9% 32 91% 12 0 0% 12 100%
2000 50 13 26% 37 74% 18 3 17% 15 83%
2001 44 16 36% 28 64% 24 7 29% 17 71%
2002 28 15 54% 13 46% 19 9 47% 10 53%
2003 27 15 56% 12 44% 11 5 45% 6 55%
2004 25 12 48% 13 52% n/a
2005 22 13 59% 9 41% n/a
2006 21 11 52% 10 48% n/a
2007 18 10 56% 8 44% n/a
2008 (or later) 22 13 59% 9 41% n/a
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samples, as NASDAQ rose in the late 1990s, inside rounds and down rounds both decreased in frequency; when NASDAQ began
falling in 2000, the frequencies of inside rounds and down rounds increased.
Clustering of inside financing in down and even rounds
As in the main sample, inside financing in the VX sample is clustered in down rounds and even rounds. In the main sample,
approximately 92% of inside rounds are down or flat (compared to 33% of outside rounds). In the VX sample rounds for which
sufficient data are available, 64% of inside rounds are down or flat (compared to 37% of outside rounds). However, a
disproportionate number of inside rounds are missing valuation data, a pattern encountered by other researchers (Kaplan et al.,
2002). To the extent poorly-performing firms are less likely to report valuations to VX, the frequency of inside rounds that are
down or flat is likely to exceed 64%.
Inside round performance
In the main sample, inside rounds are associated with lower returns. While VX does not provide information on round returns,
it does indicate the exit status of the firm: IPO, acquisition, defunct, or active (no exit yet). Since IPOs and acquisitions are
generally associated with higher rates of return for VC investors than active (probably walking dead) or defunct firms, we can use
exit outcome as a rough proxy for VC performance and for the returns associated with a financing round.
VX sample firms receiving inside financing are less likely to make it to a successful exit—an IPO or an acquisition. Out of a total
of 126 inside rounds in the VX sample, 76 were in firms that are defunct or remained active; 30 were in acquired firms; and 10
were in IPO firms. Table A2 reports that only 21% of IPO firm follow-on financings are inside rounds. Inside-round frequency for
acquired firms is 34%. For active and defunct firms, the figures are 55% and 44%, respectively. Given that many fewer startups exit
through IPO than fail or remain unsold, the primary selection bias regarding inside rounds in the main sample appears to be the
underrepresentation of inside rounds in poorly-performing firms, not the underrepresentation of inside rounds in successful
firms. While we cannot measure IRR directly for the VX sample firms, the clustering of inside rounds in firms that have bad exit
outcomes is consistent with inside rounds generally being used for backstop financing, and not for dilution.
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